CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Bangui Declaration on Joint Actions

Prefecture Programmes

Delivering for the people, Prefecture by Prefecture

IN THIS DOCUMENT

1 Towns and Population
2 Prefecture snapshots
3 Current Conditions
4 Priorities by Prefecture
5 Programme Implementation

Project Coordinator: Lord JD Waverley · office@lordwaverley.com

Contents

Each section begins on a new page. Click any title to jump straight to it in Word.

Section 1 Towns and Population 3

Section 2 Prefecture snapshots 5

Bamingui-Bangoran Prefecture 5
Bangui Prefecture 5
Basse-Kotto Prefecture 5
Haute-Kotto Prefecture 5
Haut-Mbomou Prefecture 5
Kémo Prefecture 6
Lim-Pendé Prefecture 6
Lobaye Prefecture 6
Mambéré Prefecture 6
Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture 6
Mbomou Prefecture 6
Nana-Grébizi Prefecture 7
Nana-Mambéré Prefecture 7
Ombella-M'Poko Prefecture 7
Ouaka Prefecture 7
Ouham Prefecture 7
Ouham-Fafa Prefecture 8
Ouham-Pendé Prefecture 8
Sangha-Mbaéré Prefecture 8
Vakaga Prefecture 8

Section 3 Current Conditions 9

Bamingui-Bangoran Prefecture 9
Bangui Prefecture 9
Basse-Kotto Prefecture 10
Haute-Kotto Prefecture 10
Haut-Mbomou Prefecture 10
Kémo Prefecture 11
Lim-Pendé Prefecture 11
Lobaye Prefecture 12
Mambéré Prefecture 12
Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture 12
Mbomou Prefecture 13
Nana-Grébizi Prefecture 13
Nana-Mambéré Prefecture 14
Ombella-M'Poko Prefecture 14
Ouaka Prefecture 14
Ouham Prefecture 15
Ouham-Fafa Prefecture 15
Ouham-Pendé Prefecture 15
Sangha-Mbaéré Prefecture 16
Vakaga Prefecture 16

Section 4 Priorities by Prefecture 18

Prefectures at a glance 18
Bamingui-Bangoran Prefecture 18
Bangui Prefecture 18
Basse-Kotto Prefecture 19
Haute-Kotto Prefecture 19
Haut-Mbomou Prefecture 19
Kémo Prefecture 20
Lim-Pendé Prefecture 20
Lobaye Prefecture 21
Mambéré Prefecture 21
Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture 21
Mbomou Prefecture 22
Nana-Grébizi Prefecture 22
Nana-Mambéré Prefecture 22
Ombella-M'Poko Prefecture 23
Ouaka Prefecture 23
Ouham Prefecture 24
Ouham-Fafa Prefecture 24
Ouham-Pendé Prefecture 24
Sangha-Mbaéré Prefecture 25
Vakaga Prefecture 25

Section 5 Programme Implementation 26

Category A: Urban systems 26
Category B: Recovery and growth 26
Category C: Stabilisation and reintegration 30
Category D: Active conflict and emergency 35
Recommendations 37

Project Coordinator: Lord JD Waverley · office@lordwaverley.com

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC · BANGUI DECLARATION ON JOINT ACTIONS

SECTION 1 OF 5

Towns and Population

The 20 prefectures, their capitals and principal towns

Prefecture	Capital	Town	Population
Bamingui-Bangoran	Ndélé	Ndélé	30,954
		Bamingui	no reliable current town estimate
Bangui	Bangui	Bangui	1,464,921
Basse-Kotto	Mobaye	Alindao	37,244
		Kembé	8,362
		Mobaye	8,270
Haute-Kotto	Bria	Bria	53,973
		Ouadda	no reliable current town estimate
Haut-Mbomou	Obo	Obo	16,460
		Zémio	c. 17,800*
Kémo	Sibut	Sibut	36,555
		Dékoa	22,445
Lim-Pendé	Paoua	Paoua	54,593
		Ngaoundaye	12,240
Lobaye	Mbaïki	Boda	38,006
		Mbaïki	25,512
		Mongoumba	11,882
Mambéré	Carnot	Carnot	75,022
Mambéré-Kadéï	Berbérati	Berbérati	118,529
		Gamboula	24,178
Mbomou	Bangassou	Bangassou	61,826
		Bakouma	no reliable current town estimate
		Rafaï	no reliable current town estimate
Nana-Grébizi	Kaga-Bandoro	Kaga-Bandoro	62,912
		Mbrès	11,838

Project Coordinator: Lord JD Waverley · office@lordwaverley.com

Prefecture	Capital	Town	Population
Nana-Mambéré	Bouar	Bouar	81,921
		Baoro	20,674
		Baboua	c. 34,000*
		Abba	7,283
Ombella-M'Poko	Boali	Yaloké	24,576
		Boali	20,675
		Bossembélé	20,602
		Damara	10,430
Ouaka	Bambari	Bambari	94,890
		Ippy	36,443
		Grimari	17,075
		Kouango	13,482
Ouham	Bossangoa	Bossangoa	63,261
Ouham-Fafa	Batangafo	Batangafo	31,125
		Kabo	39,539
		Bouca	22,079
Ouham-Pendé	Bozoum	Bocaranga	41,621
		Bozoum	37,989
		Bossemptélé	12,727
Sangha-Mbaéré	Nola	Nola	36,484
		Bayanga	10,194
Vakaga	Birao	Birao	9,665
		Am Dafok	c. 4,000–5,000*

** Approximate figure, as marked in the source spreadsheet. "No reliable current town estimate" is also as given in the source.*

Project Coordinator: Lord JD Waverley · office@lordwaverley.com

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC · BANGUI DECLARATION ON JOINT ACTIONS

SECTION 2 OF 5

Prefecture snapshots

Prefecture by Prefecture

Bamingui-Bangoran Prefecture

Bamingui-Bangoran is one of CAR's largest and emptiest prefectures. It covers 58,200 km², and its population was estimated at about 85,500 in 2024. It has two sub-prefectures: Ndélé, the capital and home to roughly 72,000 people, and Bamingui, with about 10,000. Ndélé is a market town east of the Bamingui-Bangoran National Park and Biosphere Reserve. Administratively, the prefecture sits in the "Fertit region" with Haute-Kotto and Vakaga, along the Chad–Sudan frontier zone.

Bangui Prefecture

Bangui prefecture was created in December 2020. It combines the capital with the communes of Bimbo and Bégoua, which were moved from Ombella-M'Poko. Covering 3,260 km², it held an estimated 1.46 million people in 2024, making it by far the most populous prefecture. In 2021 the population split roughly into 812,000 in Bangui city, 349,000 in Bimbo and 264,000 in Bégoua.

Basse-Kotto Prefecture

Basse-Kotto covers 17,604 km² in the south, and official estimates put its 2024 population at about 393,000. That makes it one of the more densely settled provinces outside Bangui. The capital, Mobaye, sits on the Ubangi River facing DRC, about 104 km by road from Alindao. The prefecture has six sub-prefectures: Alindao (the largest, about 125,000 people), Mobaye, Zangba, Kembé, Mingala and Satéma. It is overwhelmingly rural: in 2021, about 333,000 of 380,000 residents lived outside towns.

Haute-Kotto Prefecture

Haute-Kotto is CAR's largest prefecture at about 86,650 km², but one of its emptiest, with an estimated 144,000 people in 2024. It has three sub-prefectures: Bria (about 102,000 people), Ouadda (about 21,000) and Yalinga (under 5,000). Bria, the capital, is a diamond-mining town on the Kotto River, roughly 600 km north-east of Bangui. The north of the prefecture, around Sam-Ouandja, borders Vakaga and the Sudan frontier zone. Administratively it sits in the "Fertit region" with Vakaga and Bamingui-Bangoran.

Haut-Mbomou Prefecture

Haut-Mbomou is CAR's least-populated prefecture, with about 59,000 people spread over 55,530 km², roughly one person per km². Obo, the capital, lies in the far south-east near the borders with DRC and South Sudan; the African Pole of Inaccessibility is 40 km to its north. The main towns are Obo, Zémio, Djemah, Bambouti and Mboki. Obo's prefectoral hospital is the only hospital in the prefecture. Forest covers more than 93% of the land.

Project Coordinator: Lord JD Waverley · office@lordwaverley.com

Kémo Prefecture

Kémo covers 17,204 km², and official estimates put its 2024 population at about 197,500. Its capital, Sibut, is a transport hub 188 km north of Bangui at the end of the paved road from the capital, where routes branch north to Kaga-Bandoro and east. The other sub-prefectures are Dékoa, Mala and Ndjoukou. Administratively, Kémo now sits in the "Kaga region" alongside Nana-Grébizi, Ouaka and Ouham-Fafa.

Lim-Pendé Prefecture

Lim-Pendé was carved out of Ouham-Pendé in December 2020. It is small (13,210 km²) but crowded, with about 470,000 people in 2024 and around 35 per km², which is very high for rural CAR. The capital, Paoua, is the birthplace of former president Ange-Félix Patassé. The prefecture has five sub-prefectures, including Paoua (by far the largest, about 307,000 in 2021), Ngaoundaye, Kodi and Taley. Ngaoundaye lies 5 km from Chad and 20 km from Cameroon, making this a cross-border trading and herding zone. The population is overwhelmingly rural: about 394,000 of 442,000 people in 2021.

Lobaye Prefecture

Lobaye lies in the forested south-west, bordering both Congo-Brazzaville and DRC. It covers 19,235 km², and its 2024 population was estimated at about 361,000. The capital, Mbaïki, is 107 km from Bangui. The five sub-prefectures are Mbaïki (about 188,000 people in 2021), Boda (about 64,000), Boganangone, Boganda and Mongoumba, on the Ubangi River. Population is overwhelmingly rural: about 313,000 of 345,000 in 2021. The prefecture is the home region of David Dacko, CAR's first president, and has a significant Aka ("Pygmy") forest population.

Mambéré Prefecture

Mambéré was carved out of Mambéré-Kadéï in December 2020. It covers 15,740 km² and had an estimated 324,000 people in 2024. Its four sub-prefectures are Carnot (the capital, about 160,000 people), Gadzi (about 72,000), Amada-Gaza and Senkpa-Mbaéré. It sits in the "Équateur region" of the south-west alongside Nana-Mambéré, Mambéré-Kadéï and Sangha-Mbaéré. About half the population lives in urban Carnot, an unusually high share for CAR.

Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture

Since Mambéré was split off in 2020, Mambéré-Kadéï covers about 13,500 km² in the far west along the Cameroon border, with an estimated 281,000 people in 2024. The capital, Berbérati, is one of CAR's largest towns, with about 104,000 residents in 2021. The sub-prefectures include Berbérati (about 190,000 people), Gamboula on the Cameroon border (about 41,000), Dédé-Mokouba and Sosso-Nakombo. Berbérati is a hub for alluvial diamonds, and artisanal gold mining thrives across the prefecture. It is also the meeting point for CAR–Cameroon border security talks; the fourth round was held there in March 2025.

Mbomou Prefecture

Mbomou is a large southern prefecture (61,150 km²) on the Mbomou River, which forms the border with DRC. Its estimated 2024 population was about 268,000. The capital, Bangassou, had about 54,000 town residents in 2021. The five sub-prefectures are Bangassou (about 111,000 people), Ouango (about 63,000), Gambo, Bakouma and Rafaï. Nearly 80% of the population is rural. Mbomou sits in the "Haut-Oubangui region" with Basse-Kotto and Haut-Mbomou, and Bangassou is the gateway to the troubled south-east.

Nana-Grébizi Prefecture

Nana-Grébizi lies in north-central CAR, covering 19,996 km² with an estimated 232,000 people in 2024, about double the 2003 census figure. The capital, Kaga-Bandoro, is a market town and diocesan seat. The main sub-prefectures are Kaga-Bandoro, Nana-Outa and Mbrès. It sits on the main north–south road from Sibut toward Chad and is a crossroads for seasonal herd movements. Administratively, it belongs to the "Kaga region" with Kémo, Ouaka and Ouham-Fafa.

Nana-Mambéré Prefecture

Nana-Mambéré lies in the far west on the Cameroon border, covering 26,600 km² with an estimated 372,000 people in 2024. The capital, Bouar (about 72,000 town residents in 2021), is the regional hub for the west and headquarters of CAR's Evangelical Lutheran Church. The four sub-prefectures are Bouar (about 175,000 people), Baboua (about 77,000), Baoro (about 58,000) and Abba (about 31,000). The prefecture straddles the main road between Bangui and Cameroon, through Baoro, Bouar and Baboua, which carries much of the country's imports and fuel. It sits in the "Équateur region" alongside Mambéré, Mambéré-Kadéï and Sangha-Mbaéré.

Ombella-M'Poko Prefecture

Ombella-M'Poko surrounds Bangui on its western and northern sides. It had an estimated 293,000 people in 2024, after its most populous areas, Bimbo and Bégoua, were transferred to Bangui prefecture in December 2020. Boali, about 100 km north-west of Bangui, has been the capital since then. Other main towns include Bossembélé, Yaloké, Damara and Bogangolo. Two strategic assets run through it. The Boali hydroelectric plants supply Bangui and 13 other towns. And the main highway north-west from Bangui passes through Boali to Bossembélé, where it splits toward Bouar and Cameroon and toward Bossangoa and Chad.

Ouaka Prefecture

Ouaka is central CAR's most populous prefecture outside Bangui's orbit. It covers 49,900 km², borders DRC to the south, and had an estimated 459,000 people in 2024. Bambari, the capital, is a major market town on the Ouaka River and the country's main crossroads between east and west. The five sub-prefectures are Bambari (about 217,000 people in 2021), Kouango (about 108,000), Ippy (about 59,000), Grimari (about 51,000) and Bakala (about 11,000). Ouaka holds the Ndassima gold deposit, which the government values at about US$2.8 billion, as well as iron ore deposits at Bakala. Since your repository already includes Ouaka facts and figures, it would be worth reconciling those numbers with the ones here.

Ouham Prefecture

Since Ouham-Fafa was split off in 2020, Ouham covers about 20,000 km² in the north-west, with an estimated 330,000 people in 2024. The capital, Bossangoa, had about 55,000 town residents in 2021 and is the home town of former president François Bozizé. The four sub-prefectures are Bossangoa (about 167,000 people), Nana-Bakassa (about 56,000), Nanga-Boguila (about 38,000) and Markounda (about 37,000), which borders Chad. The main road from Bossangoa through Nana-Bakassa to the Chadian border is the prefecture's trade spine.

Ouham-Fafa Prefecture

Ouham-Fafa was carved out of Ouham in December 2020. It covers 32,530 km² in the north and had an estimated 239,000 people in 2024. The capital, Batangafo, sits where the Fafa River joins the Ouham. The four sub-prefectures are Batangafo (about 88,000 people in 2021), Bouca (about 81,000), Sido (about 40,000) and Kabo (about 16,000). Sido and Kabo lie on the Chad border, on the seasonal routes herders follow south. More than 80% of the population is rural.

Ouham-Pendé Prefecture

Since Lim-Pendé was split off in 2020, Ouham-Pendé covers the hilly north-west around its capital, Bozoum, with an estimated 255,000 people in 2024. The main sub-prefectures are Bocaranga (about 102,000 people in 2021), Bozoum (about 75,000), Koui (about 42,000) and Bossemptélé (about 24,000). Roughly 80% of the population is rural. The area includes key grazing land on the herding routes from Chad and Cameroon, and gold deposits around Bozoum, where government troops were deployed in 2019 to protect Chinese mining companies.

Sangha-Mbaéré Prefecture

Sangha-Mbaéré is CAR's south-western corner, bordering both Cameroon and Congo-Brazzaville. It covers 19,412 km² and had an estimated 153,000 people in 2024. The capital, Nola, is a diamond and trading town of about 32,000. The three sub-prefectures are Nola (about 96,000 people in 2021), Bambio (about 25,000) and Bayanga (about 19,000). About 70% of residents are rural. The prefecture's defining asset is the Dzanga-Sangha Protected Areas around Bayanga: a national park and a special forest reserve that form part of a forest landscape shared with Cameroon and Congo. This is one of the last strongholds of the African forest elephant, which gather in groups of 50 to 200 at the Dzanga Bai forest clearing.

Vakaga Prefecture

Vakaga is CAR's remote far-north tip, bordering Chad and Sudan. It covers 46,500 km² but had only about 89,000 people in 2024, roughly two per km². The capital is Birao. The prefecture has just two sub-prefectures: Birao (about 76,000 people in 2021) and Ouanda-Djallé (about 7,000), plus 121 villages. During the six-month rainy season, flooded rivers cut Vakaga off from the rest of the country, so its trade and daily life look toward Sudan. Unexploited oil deposits have been identified south-east of Birao. It sits in the "Fertit region" with Bamingui-Bangoran and Haute-Kotto.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC · BANGUI DECLARATION ON JOINT ACTIONS

SECTION 3 OF 5

Current Conditions

Prefecture by Prefecture

Bamingui-Bangoran Prefecture

- *Security is improving but still volatile.* Disarmament is under way: in February 2026, nine fighters from the FPRC and the Siriri coalition demobilised in Ndélé. In June 2026, MINUSCA handed its Bamingui base to the government. Risks remain, however. In August 2025, UNHCR described the prefecture as generally volatile, with armed groups robbing, extorting and assaulting refugees and residents. In February 2026, a grenade was thrown into an international NGO's compound in Ndélé, though it did not explode.
- *The Sudan war spills over.* Across the Fertit region, Sudan-linked armed actors and local self-defence groups continue to drive instability. Sudanese refugees are dispersed beyond the main Vakaga camps, and WFP has been feeding refugees in Ndélé among other locations.
- *Rule of law is very weak.* UN monitors found detainees at Ndélé police station sleeping on dirty mats in poorly ventilated rooms, with no state food. There is no functioning prison, so convicted prisoners and suspects are held together.
- *Services are thin and NGO-dependent.* Medical and psychosocial support for sexual-violence survivors relies on Ndélé hospital, INTERSOS and MSF.
- *National context.* About 2.4 million Central Africans (38%) needed humanitarian aid in 2025, against a sharply underfunded response.

Bangui Prefecture

- *Crime has replaced war as the main security threat.* Bangui is politically stable after the December 2025 elections, but several sources report a steady rise in crime-related insecurity. The commercial district is a prime target for banditry, and MINUSCA treats Bangui as a priority area for protecting civilians. The UN recorded about 94,000 internally displaced people in the prefecture.
- *Poverty is high.* Nearly 40% of Bangui residents live in poverty, which is lower than the rest of the country but affects very large numbers of people.
- *Power and water fail regularly.* In January 2026, Bangui went more than a week without electricity or tap water after breakdowns at the Boali hydro plant. Replacement parts must come from China and take at least six months to arrive. National generation is about 100 MW against estimated demand of 250 MW. Because water pumping depends on electricity, every power cut also triggers a water crisis. Residents then queue from before dawn and fall back on wells and rivers.
- *Fuel shortages are recurrent and push up the cost of living.* Shortages recurred in April and November 2025 and again in July 2026. Each time, transport fares rise, adulterated roadside fuel spreads, and household budgets are squeezed. CAR is landlocked and imports its fuel through Cameroon and Congo.
- *Flooding is worsening.* In the Kolongo and M'poko Bac neighbourhoods, around 5,000 people have lived in standing water since the July 2023 floods, exposed to malaria and cholera. Riverside districts such as Petevo, Sao and Île-des-singes face rising Ubangui waters every rainy season.

- *There are active disease threats.* In June 2026 the government declared a cholera outbreak in the Bimbo and Mbaïki health districts, with 197 confirmed cases and 24 deaths. Cholera is also surging in Zongo, directly across the river in DRC, and Ebola is circulating in DRC.

Basse-Kotto Prefecture

- *Security has been largely restored.* In June 2026, MINUSCA handed its Pombolo base in Basse-Kotto to the government as part of withdrawing from stabilised areas. In April 2025, the UPC, the main armed group in the area, signed a ceasefire and rejoined the peace process, and its fighters have since been demobilising.
- *Displaced people are coming home.* Alindao was a destination for refugees returning from abroad throughout 2025. Returnees need housing, land and livelihoods.
- *Public infrastructure is badly run down.* Local radio has reported residents' alarm at the state of Mobaye's public buildings. Schools, health centres and administrative buildings were looted or wrecked in the conflict.
- *Livelihoods are agricultural.* Subsistence farming dominates, alongside river trade on the Ubangi through Mobaye's river port.
- *National context.* About 2.4 million Central Africans (38%) needed humanitarian aid in 2025, against a sharply underfunded response. Stabilised areas like Basse-Kotto are likely to be deprioritised.

Haute-Kotto Prefecture

- *Russian forces dominate the mining economy.* The Wagner Group has extended its control over rich mining sites in eastern CAR, including Bria and Sam-Ouandja. Civilians and miners told investigators it uses terror to enforce a monopoly. In April 2024, Russian forces raided a camp near Sam-Ouandja in a failed attempt to capture LRA leader Joseph Kony.
- *The LRA is still present.* In January 2026, 12 women and children escaped Kony's faction and reached Sam-Ouandja. In February 2026, Haute-Kotto recorded more grave violations against children than any other prefecture, after child victims who had escaped the LRA reached the prefecture.
- *Sudan spillover is reaching the north.* In March–April 2026, Russian-linked security personnel clashed with Sudanese armed elements on the Sam-Ouandja–Ouanda-Djallé road. More armed deployments along key roads have created a climate of fear that restricts movement and livelihoods. Sudanese refugees are also dispersed in Haute-Kotto, beyond the main Vakaga camps.
- *Protection risks remain high.* In July 2026, the Protection Cluster listed Haute-Kotto among the prefectures still recording serious abuses: killings, sexual violence, abductions, extortion, road occupation and illegal taxation. It also lists Haute-Kotto among the areas with high child recruitment by armed groups.
- *National context.* About 428,000 people remain internally displaced nationwide. The 2026 humanitarian plan needs about US$264 million for 1.3 million people but is so underfunded that agencies are cutting to the bare minimum, and protection monitoring has shrunk by about 30%.

Haut-Mbomou Prefecture

- *This is currently CAR's most violent prefecture.* Heavy fighting between the army and the AAKG broke out around the December 2025 elections. On election day, the Bambouti sub-prefect and a gendarme were abducted. Zémio was attacked again in early January 2026, and about 2,000 people sheltered in the

church and hospital while others fled into DRC. In February 2026, Haut-Mbomou recorded more human rights violations than any other prefecture.

- *Bambouti is largely empty.* In February 2026, a UN team found the town largely deserted and its infrastructure looted, though security had improved enough to consider returns. The hostages taken in December were confirmed alive at that point, and the government has signalled openness to dialogue.
- *Abuses come from all sides.* In March 2026, the AAKG ambushed an army patrol near Obo, while government soldiers and Russian-linked personnel looted eight families' homes near Obo. The July 2026 Protection Cluster analysis reports killings, abductions, sexual violence and forced recruitment by state forces, the AAKG and a resurgent LRA around Djemah, plus tension toward the Muslim community after clashes in Zémio in June. Peuhl herders were twice barred from Zémio market, and about 1,500 left the area in February 2025.
- *Mass displacement with little aid.* The south-east hosts about 30,000 displaced people. Attacks on humanitarian teams forced aid operations in Haut-Mbomou and Mbomou to be temporarily suspended. The 300 km road from Bangassou to Zémio takes 16–17 hours and is unsafe. Zémio's secondary school had only 72 students, down from 992 the year before.
- *There are some returns.* Reopening a secured river crossing at Zémio in February 2026 let about 700 people return from DRC.

Kémo Prefecture

- *Security is improving but fragile.* Nationally, fighting slowed in 2025 for the first time in years, and elections were held in December. In June 2026 MINUSCA handed its Dékoa base to the government as part of withdrawing from areas judged stabilised. That makes Kémo a "consolidation" prefecture, where security now depends on national forces.
- *Farmer–herder tension is the main live threat.* In January 2025, transhumance-related violence east of Sibut displaced residents toward Mala, and a Peuhl herder was killed in an attack near Galafondo, south of Sibut.
- *Health has a bright spot.* With World Bank support, the Sibut district hospital has a new maternity unit and offers a full package of care. Its medicines still have to be trucked from Bangui, and rural areas are far less well served.
- *Livelihoods are agricultural.* Cassava and groundnuts are staples, with sesame also grown, and the Sibut market is the region's commercial anchor. Rainy-season flooding and impassable roads periodically cut off farms and markets.
- *National context.* About 2.4 million people (38% of the population) needed humanitarian aid in 2025, and roughly one in three Central Africans is acutely food insecure. Funding cuts have shrunk the humanitarian response, so stabilised areas like Kémo are likely to be deprioritised.

Lim-Pendé Prefecture

- *The 3R remains active despite the peace deal.* According to the July 2026 Protection Cluster analysis, demobilisation has progressed but unevenly, and the 3R still holds armed positions across rural Lim-Pendé. Tensions with the army rose after three 3R fighters were killed at an army checkpoint, creating uncertainty around Pougol and Paoua.
- *Sexual violence is the defining abuse.* In February 2026, every case of conflict-related sexual violence attributed to signatory armed groups nationwide involved the 3R in Lim-Pendé. In one incident, 3R

members abducted a 15-year-old girl and seven women from their fields at Tatou and raped them. Further cases have been documented in Tatum, Doula, Lemouna and Boko-Mboussi.

- *Farmer–herder violence is rising.* Revenge attacks linked to crop destruction and cattle theft killed and injured people at Galé 2 and Bondondi. Nationwide, 601 transhumance-related incidents were recorded in the first half of 2026, with destroyed crops the main trigger. The north-west, including Lim-Pendé, is a principal hotspot.
- *State forces are part of the problem.* There are reports of arbitrary arrests, cruel treatment and extortion by soldiers, sometimes alongside Russian-linked personnel. In February 2026, a dispute between two soldiers at Taley ended in a shootout that killed both.
- *Cross-border pressures.* During an earlier influx, more than 37,000 people fleeing violence in southern Chad gathered at the border, and the most vulnerable were resettled at Bétoko in Lim-Pendé.

Lobaye Prefecture

- *Security is stable.* In June 2026, MINUSCA handed over seven bases, including its Mbaïki base, at a ceremony in Mbaïki itself. That makes Lobaye one of the "stabilised" prefectures where security now rests with national forces.
- *Rural poverty is the core problem.* Most inhabitants are coffee farmers and are extremely poor. Few children reach secondary school, and many die for lack of medical care. Coverage during the December 2025 elections described a farming and forestry economy facing serious infrastructure and development gaps, with a young, growing population short of opportunities.
- *There is an active cholera outbreak.* In June 2026, the government declared CAR's fifth-ever cholera outbreak, centred on the Mbaïki and Bimbo health districts, with 197 confirmed cases and 24 deaths.
- *Logging is displacing forest peoples.* Industrial and illegal logging is clearing forest that Aka communities depend on. At Mbata, about 110 km from Bangui, living conditions have worsened since loggers arrived in the 1980s, and some Aka now cross into DRC to find intact forest. A 2025 study found Lobaye's Aka are being dispossessed without compensation, and their customary land rights are not recognised.
- *Mining is controlled by outsiders.* Wagner has extended its control over rich mining sites, including Boda.

Mambéré Prefecture

Relatively calm, but mining is controlled by outside armed actors. Mambéré features little in recent conflict reporting. But across CAR, mines have become the economic core of Russian operations. Control passed from Wagner to the Russian defence ministry's Africa Corps after 2023, and production and profits are neither monitored nor regulated.

- *Artisanal miners remain poor.* The Kimberley Process embargo often hurt artisanal miners more than armed groups, and its abrupt lifting in 2024 has not yet translated into better incomes or governance.
- *The Muslim community has never fully returned.* Its absence has hollowed out the trading and livestock networks it used to run.
- *Neighbouring areas remain unstable.* Elsewhere in the Équateur region, the 3R armed group was still levying illegal taxes and abducting civilians in early 2026.

Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture

Generally calm, with insecurity on key roads. A September 2026 UN report describes the area as broadly calm. But attacks on herders and traders continue on the Berbérati–Sosso-Nakombo road, especially around

Benewayo. UN police now patrol daily on the roads to Carnot, Sosso-Nakombo, Nola and Gamboula, and traders and transporters say this has restored confidence to travel to markets.

- *Movement restrictions are among the country's worst.* In the first half of 2026, the Protection Cluster ranked Mambéré-Kadéï among the prefectures most affected by restrictions on movement and forced displacement, citing illegal checkpoints, extortion, abductions and threats.
- *Armed groups are still active at the margins.* In June 2025, the army and Russian-linked personnel clashed with the 3R at Yamalé, 103 km from Berbérati, and residents fled to Bania. In February 2026, anti-Balaka fighters led by a self-proclaimed "General" Ndalet were reported moving and trying to settle near Nandobo, 45 km north of Berbérati.
- *Farmer–herder tension persists.* Residents credit dialogue on respecting cattle corridors with easing long-standing conflicts, but transhumance remains a flashpoint.

Mbomou Prefecture

The Haut-Mbomou crisis is spilling over. The Azande AAKG militia is active in Mbomou as well as Haut-Mbomou. On 3 February 2026, it attacked an army detachment at Dembia, wounding two soldiers and briefly displacing civilians. In March 2026, overcrowding in Bangassou's prison meant children were held with adults, and Peuhl herders were detained illegally in Bangassou and Bakouma until UN advocacy secured their release.

- *Displacement is high.* As of March 2026, Mbomou had nine displacement sites: four at Rafaï, three at Bangassou and two at Bakouma. In 2025, about 1,500 Peuhl driven out of Zémio resettled around Bakouma. In July 2025, WHO reported that Rafaï's secondary hospital was strained by displaced arrivals.
- *Aid access is fragile.* Attacks on humanitarian teams forced temporary suspensions of operations in Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou. A hospital in Mbomou was entered by militiamen hunting for wounded soldiers. The road from Bangassou to Zémio takes 16–17 hours and is unsafe. The July 2026 Protection Cluster analysis ranks Mbomou among the three prefectures at highest risk of attacks on civilians.

Nana-Grébizi Prefecture

- *The peace process is advancing.* On 19 November 2025, the MPC signed an agreement in N'Djamena committing to end its activities in Kémo, Nana-Grébizi and Ouham-Fafa and rejoin the national peace accord. Its disarmament resumed in mid-2026.
- *Kidnapping and armed movements persist.* In March 2026, armed men abducted several civilians at Grevaï, 30 km east of Kaga-Bandoro, and there were further reports of kidnappings, hostage-taking and armed movements around the town.
- *Farmer–herder friction is a leading risk.* In February 2026, farmers at Kaga-Bandoro and Nana-Outa reported fresh destruction of their fields by Peuhl and Mbororo herds, raising the risk of intercommunal violence.
- *The security transition carries risks.* MINUSCA is closing its Mbrès base. The July 2026 Protection Cluster analysis names Nana-Grébizi among the prefectures where base closures create a real risk of worsening protection for civilians.
- *Displacement and weak services persist.* As of March 2026, Kaga-Bandoro still had eight sites for displaced people. Detention conditions were poor, with an old house in use as a holding facility. Aid agencies have also supported Sudanese refugees at Kaga-Bandoro.

Nana-Mambéré Prefecture

- *3R disarmament is under way but incomplete.* Since the April 2025 N'Djamena agreement, 3R fighters have been disarmed in stages, including at Bouar and Koui. A further operation for 100 3R fighters was planned in mid-2026 at Ndongué-Douane in Nana-Mambéré. In June 2026, MINUSCA also handed its Dilapoko base to the government.
- *Residual 3R violence continues.* On 10 February 2026, 3R members abducted six civilians, including a 73-year-old village chief, at Gobolo, 129 km west of Bouar. In March 2026, 3R members awaiting disarmament were still taxing livestock illegally at Zotoua, 25 km south of Bouar. Four artisanal miners were then killed and a camp burned at Zotoua-Banguerem, with 3R members suspected. Clashes between 3R factions, one apparently working with Russian-linked security personnel, raised concerns about armed groups operating alongside state-affiliated actors.
- *Justice capacity is growing.* MINUSCA has supported court open days and prison reform in Bouar to improve access to justice.

Ombella-M'Poko Prefecture

- *Farmer–herder violence is close to the capital.* Between 1 and 18 January 2025, five men were killed, including four Peuhl herders around Bouboui, 35 km from Bangui. Eight more herders were wounded and livestock was looted, with further incidents around Boali and Bossembélé. In February 2026, near Sakoussa, 18 km east of Bangui, a Peuhl herder was killed in revenge for the deaths of four hunters days earlier, and security forces deployed to prevent escalation.
- *3R violence extends this far south.* In February 2026, 3R members repeatedly attacked and looted civilians at Bobala, displacing residents. In March 2026, about 50 3R members abducted two men at Bougoula on the Boali–Poste road. One was killed when his family could not pay a ransom of 3 million CFA francs (about US$3,000). Armed men also attacked an army position at Bogoula, 53 km from Bangui, wounding two soldiers.
- *Movement restrictions and community violence are widespread.* The July 2026 Protection Cluster analysis ranks Ombella-M'Poko among the prefectures most affected by illegal checkpoints, extortion, abductions and forced displacement. It also lists rural Ombella-M'Poko among the areas worst affected by witchcraft accusations and mob justice. The prefecture remains a main hotspot for transhumance conflict.
- *Some state presence is improving.* In February 2026, MINUSCA handed a rehabilitated court in Bossembélé to national authorities. In March 2026, there were post-election tensions in Bossembélé after legislative results were confirmed.
- *Boali's power plant is fragile.* In January 2026, breakdowns at Boali left Bangui without electricity or tap water for over a week, and replacement parts take at least six months to arrive.

Ouaka Prefecture

- *The UPC is demobilising.* The UPC signed a ceasefire in April 2025, and its disarmament was formally launched with Darassa at Maloum in July 2025. Former UPC and 3R fighters began training in March 2026 to become forest and water rangers.
- *Mining violence is the main flashpoint.* On 26 March 2026, a self-defence group called the "Wagner noirs", reportedly operating alongside Russian-linked security personnel, opened fire at Ndassima, killing at least four artisanal miners. Reprisals destroyed the town hall at Ndjoubissi and caused widespread panic.

- *State forces are a source of abuse.* Soldiers, gendarmes and police continued to levy illegal taxes at checkpoints around Bambari in 2026. In February 2026, a dispute between soldiers near Bakala ended in a fatal shooting. Bambari's gendarmerie held 20 detainees for one to two weeks. The central prison is overcrowded, with a food allowance of only 93 CFA francs (about US$0.16) per prisoner per day.
- *Displacement and community violence persist.* As of March 2026, Ouaka still had 12 sites for displaced people: eight in Bambari, three in Ippy and one in Bakala. The Protection Cluster names Bambari and Ouaka among the areas worst affected by witchcraft accusations and mob justice.
- *The security transition carries risks.* In June 2026, MINUSCA handed its Ippy and Kouango bases to the government. The Protection Cluster lists Ouaka among the outlying prefectures where base closures risk worsening protection for civilians.

Ouham Prefecture

- *Residual rebels and abuses by state forces both persist.* In March 2026, attacks by CPC-affiliated anti-Balaka and the FDLP, along with farmer–herder clashes, caused civilian casualties and displacement. On 2 March, FDLP fighters attacked a mining site at Fiessa near Markounda, killing three Chadian nationals. From 11 to 13 March, a joint operation by soldiers, Russian-linked personnel and UPC members acting as intermediaries at Bowaye looted a health centre, burned houses and forced residents to flee. An FDLP commander arrested at Kouki on 18 March was handed to Russian-linked personnel without judicial notice, and his whereabouts were unknown at the time of reporting.
- *Disarmament is slow.* UPC fighters had been waiting at Kouki since June 2025 to disarm, which the UN said heightened protection risks. A disarmament operation for 120 UPC and 80 MPC fighters at Kouki was finally scheduled for June 2026.
- *Farmer–herder violence is deadly.* In February 2026, transhumance-related incidents in the north-west killed five civilians and injured at least seven, including at Bobéré and near Bokine, just north of Bossangoa. The Protection Cluster names Ouham as one of the main transhumance hotspots and as a prefecture with high child recruitment.
- *There are signs of progress.* UN monitors found detention conditions satisfactory at Nana-Bakassa gendarmerie after infrastructure improvements. MINUSCA is closing its Markounda base.

Ouham-Fafa Prefecture

- *The peace process is reaching the MPC.* In November 2025, the MPC signed an agreement in N'Djamena committing to end its activities in Ouham-Fafa, Kémo and Nana-Grébizi. Disarmament of MPC fighters resumed in mid-2026.
- *This is the country's largest concentration of displacement sites.* As of March 2026, Ouham-Fafa had 25 of the country's 77 sites: 10 in Batangafo, 8 in Bouca and 7 in Kabo. Many are small scattered sites along the Batangafo, Bouca and Ouandago roads, which aid agencies assessed in 2025.
- *Attacks still cause new displacement.* On 4 February 2026, unidentified armed men attacked Yima, 18 km east of Batangafo, displacing more than 100 people.
- *Health care depends heavily on MSF.* MSF runs Batangafo's 150-bed general hospital and supports five surrounding health centres. In 2018, that hospital doubled as the town's refuge.

Ouham-Pendé Prefecture

- *3R disarmament has begun but the group still causes the most harm.* 3R fighters were disarmed at Koui in July 2025 and again in March 2026, when 73 fighters handed in their weapons. Yet in March 2026,

Ouham-Pendé (counted together with Lim-Pendé) recorded more human rights violations than any other prefecture, driven by 19 cases of 3R child recruitment. All the girls aged 14 to 16 who suffered conflict-related sexual violence by the 3R that month had also been recruited by the group in Ouham-Pendé. Many recruited children were identified only after disarmament operations.

- *Clashes and aid obstruction persist.* In January 2025, fighting between the 3R and local self-defence groups displaced residents of Ngoutéré and Bozoum. In February 2026, 3R members denied NGOs humanitarian access in Ouham-Pendé.
- *Farmer–herder violence is deadly.* On 31 January 2026, transhumance-related attacks at Kounang and Kowone, 43 km from Bocaranga, killed and injured civilians and caused heavy livestock losses. The Protection Cluster lists Ouham-Pendé as a main transhumance hotspot and among the prefectures still recording grave rights violations.

Sangha-Mbaéré Prefecture

- *Security is relatively stable.* Sangha-Mbaéré escaped the worst of CAR's armed conflict. UN police now patrol daily on the Berbérati–Nola road, linking it to the rest of the west.
- *Conservation is a major employer.* About 340 staff, including 140 rangers, work in the protected areas under joint management by the forestry ministry, WWF and a specialist conservation organisation. One group of habituated gorillas reopened to tourists in 2025, with two more being prepared.
- *Prisons and state services are failing.* In February 2026, UN monitors found that health care at Nola prison had stopped entirely. There was no water or electricity, sanitation was appalling, and the food allowance was just 67 CFA francs (about US$0.12) per prisoner per day. This reflects how thin state services are in this remote corner.

Vakaga Prefecture

Vakaga is now one of CAR's most acute crises, driven mostly by Sudan's war.

- *It hosts a large refugee population.* As of June 2026, the Korsi site in Birao held about 24,800 Sudanese refugees, roughly a quarter of the prefecture's own population. Vakaga was already one of CAR's poorest areas: 46% of people are food insecure, and 89% of households cannot afford a healthy diet. At Korsi, water and sanitation fall below emergency standards, with 52 people sharing each latrine.
- *Sudan's war is spilling across the border.* Fighters from Sudan's Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have made incursions into Vakaga, tried to set up checkpoints and recruited local youth. In February 2026, about 100 RSF members were positioned 400 metres from the border at Birao. On 15 February, RSF members attacked a civilian vehicle near Sikikédé, killing a pregnant woman and a four-year-old boy.
- *A major attack hit Am-Dafock.* On 30 June 2026, an armed group attacked the border town of Am-Dafock, killing civilians and members of the security forces and displacing about 17,000 people. Government forces retook the town. At least 16,000 displaced Central Africans gathered around the MINUSCA base there.
- *Abuses by state forces and militias add to the danger.* On 27 February 2026, soldiers opened fire on civilians at Ouanda-Djallé after an altercation, killing three and wounding ten, including children. Russian-linked personnel and Birao self-defence militias detained and beat three young men at Delembé. A self-defence group known as the "Wagner noirs", reportedly trained with Russian-linked support, killed a civilian at Am-Dafock. Operations against the FPRC armed group around Gounda reportedly left about nine fighters dead, and two of three captured fighters were later killed.

- *Community relations and aid access are fraying*. Tensions are rising between the Rounga and Goula communities. Vakaga recorded more incidents against aid workers than any other prefecture in January–July 2026. In August 2025, insecurity around Birao disrupted farming at the peak of the season, causing shortages and rising prices. On the positive side, the prefect has issued a directive banning child recruitment by self-defence groups.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC · BANGUI DECLARATION ON JOINT ACTIONS

SECTION 4 OF 5

Priorities by Prefecture

Seven priority interventions for each prefecture

Prefectures at a glance

Seven prefectures are ready for development delivery. Nine require packages built around disarmament and farmer–herder peace. Four need emergency and protection-led approaches first.

Bamingui-Bangoran Prefecture

1. **Security and justice.** This means trained gendarmes and police, a functioning court and prison, and protection for traders and aid workers on the roads, as the state takes over from MINUSCA.
2. **Reintegration and reconciliation.** Livelihoods for demobilised FPRC and Siriri fighters, and dialogue among Runga, Goula and Kara communities to prevent a repeat of 2020.
3. **Ending isolation.** Road links from Ndélé to Kaga-Bandoro, Bria and Birao, plus mobile coverage, so that markets, services and the state can reach people.
4. **Food security and livelihoods.** Support for farming and herding, peaceful transhumance management, and market access to bring down prices.
5. **Health and protection.** Strengthen Ndélé hospital and rural health posts, and keep sexual-violence and child-protection services running.
6. **Support for refugee-hosting communities.** Shared water, schools and clinics, so that Sudanese arrivals don't strain host families.
7. **Conservation-linked jobs.** Ranger, tourism and park-buffer livelihoods tied to the national park, for the longer term.

Bangui Prefecture

1. **Reliable electricity.** Spare parts and maintenance for Boali, more solar and thermal capacity, and backup power for water pumping and hospitals.
2. **Safe water and sanitation.** Expand the water network and standpipes into underserved districts and Bimbo and Bégoua, and build latrines and drainage. Cholera prevention depends on this.
3. **Flood protection and resettlement.** Drainage works, river defences, and planned relocation for households in permanently flooded areas.
4. **Jobs and livelihoods.** Work for a large young urban population, especially in the informal economy that collapses whenever power and fuel fail.
5. **Community policing and public safety.** Neighbourhood policing, street lighting, and youth programmes to curb crime.

Project Coordinator: Lord JD Waverley · office@lordwaverley.com

6. **Health system resilience.** Epidemic preparedness for cholera, Ebola and measles, plus reliable water and power at health facilities.
7. **Fuel supply security.** Strategic fuel stocks and transparent import arrangements to stop recurrent shortages and price spikes.

Basse-Kotto Prefecture

1. **Reconciliation and justice.** Community dialogue between Christian and Muslim communities and between farmers and herders, plus accountability for the atrocities of 2017–2018. Trust between communities is the foundation for everything else.
2. **Reintegration of returnees and ex-fighters.** Shelter, land-dispute resolution and livelihoods for returning refugees, displaced people and demobilised UPC and anti-Balaka members.
3. **Rebuilding public services.** Rehabilitate schools, health centres and administrative buildings in Mobaye, Alindao and the smaller sub-prefecture towns, and get teachers and health workers back.
4. **Roads and river trade.** Repair the Alindao–Bambari, Alindao–Mobaye and Mobaye–Zangba roads, and invest in Mobaye's river port to reconnect farmers to markets.
5. **Agriculture and food security.** Seeds, tools, storage and processing support for a mainly farming population whose production was disrupted for years.
6. **Health.** Strengthen district hospitals and rural health posts, with disease surveillance given the cholera and Ebola threats along the Ubangi.
7. **Water and sanitation.** Boreholes and latrines in return areas.

Haute-Kotto Prefecture

1. **Protection and accountable security.** Disciplined national forces and police, monitoring of abuses by all armed actors including Russian-linked personnel, and safe roads for traders and aid.
2. **A fair deal from mining.** Formal, transparent artisanal-mining arrangements so that diamond wealth reaches local miners and communities rather than armed actors.
3. **Child protection and reintegration.** Care, family tracing and schooling for children escaping the LRA and other armed groups, plus prevention of recruitment.
4. **Durable solutions for displaced people.** Housing, land and services so that people who lived for years in PK3 and similar sites can resettle or return home.
5. **Ending isolation.** Repair roads linking Bria to Ippy, Ouadda and Yalinga so markets, health and the state can reach outlying areas.
6. **Health and sexual-violence services.** Strengthen Bria hospital and mobile clinics for scattered rural settlements.
7. **Food security and livelihoods.** Support farming and alternatives to mining, especially for young people.

Haut-Mbomou Prefecture

1. **Ending the AAKG–state conflict.** Negotiated dialogue, release of hostages and a disarmament path for the AAKG, plus accountability for abuses by all sides, including state forces.
2. **Protection of civilians.** Safe access to fields, markets and roads for all communities. Peuhl and Muslim residents are especially exposed.

3. **Emergency aid for displaced people.** Shelter, food, water and health care for about 30,000 people around Zémio, with safe access for aid convoys.
4. **Reconnecting the region.** Secure and rehabilitate the Bangassou–Zémio–Obo road, which is the lifeline for goods, services and the state.
5. **Health.** Support Obo's hospital as the sole referral facility, plus mobile clinics and sexual-violence care.
6. **Education and youth.** Reopen schools and get teachers back, and give young people alternatives to recruitment by the AAKG or the LRA.
7. **Reconciliation.** Rebuild trust between Azande and Peuhl communities that has collapsed since 2023.

Kémo Prefecture

1. **Local security and conflict mediation.** This means farmer–herder dialogue committees, agreed transhumance corridors, and support for the state as it takes over from MINUSCA.
2. **Roads and market access.** All-season maintenance of the Sibut–Dékoa–Kaga-Bandoro axis and feeder roads, so produce reaches Sibut and Bangui.
3. **Agricultural recovery.** Seeds, tools, storage and small-scale cassava and groundnut processing to raise incomes and reduce food insecurity.
4. **Health beyond Sibut.** Extend the hospital's model to health posts in Dékoa, Mala and Ndjoukou, with a reliable drug supply chain.
5. **Education.** Rehabilitate schools damaged in 2013–15 and pay and retain teachers.
6. **Water and sanitation.** Rural boreholes, which are among the needs rising fastest nationally.
7. **Youth jobs and reintegration.** Work for young people and demobilised fighters, to reduce recruitment risk.

Lim-Pendé Prefecture

1. **Completing 3R disarmament.** Finish demobilisation and reintegrate ex-fighters, especially Fulani youth, into livelihoods, with monitoring to stop renewed abuses.
2. **Sexual-violence prevention and survivor care.** Medical, psychosocial and legal support for survivors, plus safety measures for women working in fields or fetching water.
3. **Farmer–herder peace.** Agreed transhumance corridors, mediation committees and compensation mechanisms for crop damage.
4. **Accountable security forces.** Discipline and oversight of the army and of Russian-linked personnel, and an end to illegal checkpoints and extortion.
5. **Agriculture and food security.** Seeds, tools and market access for a large farming population whose harvests are repeatedly disrupted.
6. **Health and education.** Restore rural health posts and schools across a densely populated area that has been neglected for decades.
7. **Cross-border cooperation.** Coordination with Chad and Cameroon on herder movements, refugees and armed-group mobility.

Project Coordinator: Lord JD Waverley · office@lordwaverley.com

Lobaye Prefecture

1. **Cholera control and safe water.** Contain the outbreak, then invest in boreholes, water treatment and sanitation across Mbaïki and the rural sub-prefectures.
2. **Health care.** Strengthen Mbaïki's hospital and rural health posts, with maternal and child health a priority given high preventable mortality.
3. **Farm incomes.** Revive coffee and food-crop value chains through better inputs, processing, fair prices and roads to Bangui markets.
4. **Rights and livelihoods for the Aka.** Recognise customary land rights, share logging revenues and fund community forestry, so that indigenous communities benefit from rather than lose their forest.
5. **Sustainable forestry.** Enforce logging rules and curb illegal timber trafficking, keeping timber revenue in the prefecture.
6. **Education and youth employment.** Expand schooling beyond primary level and create jobs in agro-processing and forestry for a young population.
7. **Reconciliation.** Create conditions for displaced Muslim residents to return safely to Mbaïki and Boda.

Mambéré Prefecture

1. **Fair and transparent mining.** Formalise artisanal diamond and gold mining through cooperatives, fair buying prices, traceability and local revenue-sharing, so mineral wealth benefits Carnot's miners rather than outside actors.
2. **Reconciliation and return.** Create conditions for displaced Muslim traders and herders to return safely to Carnot and Guen, rebuilding trade between communities.
3. **Health care.** Sustain Carnot hospital and extend services to Gadzi, Amada-Gaza and Senkpa-Mbaéré.
4. **Diversified livelihoods.** Agriculture, agro-processing and vocational training for young people, reducing dependence on volatile mining.
5. **Roads and connectivity.** Better links to Berbérati, Bouar and Bangui, plus mobile coverage outside the main towns.
6. **Education.** Schools and teachers, especially in mining areas where children are drawn into work early.
7. **Mine-site safety and environment.** Safer working conditions on mining sites and land restoration after alluvial digging.

Mambéré-Kadéï Prefecture

1. **Safe roads and markets.** Remove illegal checkpoints, end extortion, and secure the Sosso-Nakombo and Gamboula routes so traders and herders can move freely. This will matter more as MINUSCA's footprint shrinks.
2. **Farmer–herder agreements.** Mapped transhumance corridors, local mediation committees, and compensation for crop damage.
3. **Fair mining.** Formalise artisanal diamond and gold mining so miners get fair prices and local revenue stays in Berbérati.
4. **Reconciliation and returns.** Rebuild Christian–Muslim trust and support the return of displaced Muslim traders from Cameroon.
5. **Protection services.** Gender-based violence services, legal aid, and police who respond to abuses rather than commit them.

6. **Health and education.** Strengthen Berbérati's regional hospital as a referral centre for the west, and support rural schools.
7. **Cross-border cooperation.** Sustain the Cameroon–CAR security dialogue on armed groups, smuggling and herd movements.

Mbomou Prefecture

1. **Containing the AAKG conflict.** Dialogue, protection of civilians and accountable security forces, to stop the Haut-Mbomou crisis spreading further into Rafaï and Bakouma.
2. **Durable solutions for the displaced.** Return or local integration for Tokoyo's Muslims, still largely displaced since 2017, and for newly displaced Peuhl and others at Rafaï and Bakouma.
3. **Reconciliation in Bangassou.** Restore Tokoyo, its market and mosque, and rebuild cross-community trade, building on strong Catholic and community peace networks.
4. **Health.** Sustain Bangassou's hospital and reinforce Rafaï's, with mobile clinics for displacement sites.
5. **Justice and detention.** A functioning, non-overcrowded prison, separation of children from adults, and an end to arbitrary detention.
6. **Roads and aid access.** Secure the Bangassou–Rafaï–Zémio and Bangassou–Bakouma routes for trade, services and humanitarian convoys.
7. **Livelihoods and food security.** Farming support and cross-river trade with DRC for a mostly rural population.

Nana-Grébizi Prefecture

1. **Completing MPC disarmament.** Reintegrate demobilised fighters with jobs and training, and prevent splinter factions from forming.
2. **Filling the security gap at Mbrès.** Ensure national forces and police maintain presence and patrols, with accountability, as MINUSCA leaves.
3. **Farmer–herder peace.** Agreed transhumance corridors, mediation committees and compensation for crop damage. Local roundtables on free movement and transhumance since 2019 offer a base to build on.
4. **Durable solutions for displaced people.** Help residents of the eight Kaga-Bandoro sites return home or settle locally, with land and housing support.
5. **Justice and rule of law.** A proper court and prison in Kaga-Bandoro, and an end to kidnappings for ransom.
6. **Agriculture and markets.** Inputs, storage and secure roads, so that farmers can benefit from Kaga-Bandoro's position on the main trade corridor.
7. **Health, education and water.** Restore services in rural areas around Mbrès and Nana-Outa, which were neglected during years of armed-group rule.

Nana-Mambéré Prefecture

1. **Completing 3R disarmament and reintegration.** Demobilise remaining fighters and give former combatants, many of them young herders, livestock and farming livelihoods, so the group does not reconstitute.

2. **Ending illegal taxation and abductions.** Remove armed checkpoints on livestock routes and rural roads, and guarantee that state-affiliated forces do not collude with armed groups.
3. **Farmer–herder coexistence.** This is the heart of the conflict here: agreed corridors, mediation, livestock markets and fair dispute resolution between Fulani herders and farming communities.
4. **Safe, fair mining.** Protect artisanal miners around Yidéré-Baboua and Zotoua, and bring mine revenues under transparent state oversight.
5. **Securing the Cameroon corridor.** Keep the Bouar–Baboua–Garoua-Boulaï road safe and well maintained, as a national lifeline and a local source of trade and jobs.
6. **Justice and accountability.** Build on progress in Bouar with courts that reach rural areas and accountability for abuses.
7. **Health, education and water.** Restore services in rural Abba, Baboua and Baoro, which were neglected during years of armed-group control.

Ombella-M'Poko Prefecture

1. **Ending kidnapping and armed incursions.** Secure the Boali–Bossembélé–Yaloké corridor and rural roads, and complete 3R disarmament so the group stops operating this close to the capital.
2. **Farmer–herder peace.** Mapped corridors, mediation committees and compensation, to break revenge cycles between Peuhl herders and farming and hunting communities.
3. **Access to justice.** Make Bossembélé's court and others functional and accessible, to replace mob justice and to protect people accused of witchcraft, mainly older women, widows and children.
4. **Protecting and modernising the Boali hydro plants.** Maintenance, spare parts and investment in new capacity, which also offers local jobs.
5. **Agriculture and market access.** Help farmers supply Bangui, the country's biggest market, which sits on their doorstep.
6. **Health, water and schools.** Basic services in rural areas such as Bogangolo and Damara, which are poorly served despite being close to the capital.
7. **Free movement.** Remove illegal checkpoints and stop extortion on the routes that feed Bangui.

Ouaka Prefecture

1. **Fair access to mining wealth.** Protect artisanal miners from armed violence, give them secure access to sites around Ndassima, and channel mining revenues into local development rather than outside actors.
2. **Accountable security forces.** Remove illegal checkpoints, end extortion, and disband or bring under control the militias working alongside Russian-linked personnel.
3. **UPC reintegration.** Livelihoods for demobilised UPC fighters, many from herder communities, plus support for the communities receiving them.
4. **Durable solutions for displaced people.** Return or local integration for residents of the 12 displacement sites, with land and housing help.
5. **Justice and detention.** Functioning courts, humane prisons and legal protection for people accused of witchcraft.
6. **Roads and trade.** Secure the Bambari–Ippy–Bria, Bambari–Alindao and Bambari–Grimari–Sibut routes that make Bambari a regional market.
7. **Health, education and water.**

Ouham Prefecture

1. **Completing disarmament.** Process the UPC and MPC fighters waiting at Kouki, bring the FDLP and remaining CPC elements into the peace process, and fund reintegration.
2. **Accountable security operations.** Stop the use of armed-group intermediaries, protect health centres and homes during operations, and end arrests that bypass the justice system.
3. **Farmer–herder peace.** Agreed corridors, mediation and compensation, especially along the Bossangoa–Chad road.
4. **Youth alternatives.** Build on Bossangoa's experience of young people resisting recruitment, with jobs, training and peace programmes.
5. **Safe border mining and trade.** Protect miners and traders around Markounda, and coordinate with Chad on cross-border armed groups.
6. **Health and education.** Rebuild looted health centres and support schools across the rural sub-prefectures.
7. **Durable solutions for displaced people.** Help those displaced by CPC fighting and by recent operations to return home.

Ouham-Fafa Prefecture

1. **Durable solutions for displaced people.** Ouham-Fafa's most urgent and distinctive need: help residents of 25 sites, some displaced for a decade, return home or settle locally, with land, housing and livelihood support.
2. **Completing MPC disarmament.** Reintegrate fighters around Sido and Kabo, and fill the security gap they leave with accountable national forces.
3. **Protecting civilians in rural areas.** Patrols and early warning on the Batangafo, Bouca and Kabo roads to stop attacks like the one at Yima.
4. **Farmer–herder management.** Corridors, mediation and cooperation with Chad on herds entering through Sido and Kabo.
5. **Sustainable health care.** Secure the long-term future of Batangafo hospital and rural health centres beyond MSF, with the Ministry of Health and other partners.
6. **Food security and livelihoods.** Seeds, tools and market access so displaced and returning families can farm again.
7. **Education and youth.** Schools in displacement sites and return areas, plus alternatives to armed-group recruitment.

Ouham-Pendé Prefecture

1. **Rescuing and reintegrating child soldiers.** Release all children held by the 3R, then provide family reunification, psychosocial care, schooling and protection against re-recruitment. This is the most urgent need specific to Ouham-Pendé.
2. **Completing 3R disarmament.** Demobilise remaining fighters around Koui and Bocaranga, with livelihoods so they do not return to arms.
3. **Care for survivors of sexual violence.** Medical, psychosocial and legal support, especially for adolescent girls.

Project Coordinator: Lord JD Waverley · office@lordwaverley.com

4. **Farmer–herder peace.** Corridors, mediation and compensation for crop and livestock losses, to stop revenge cycles.
5. **Humanitarian access.** Guaranteed safe access for aid agencies, which have repeatedly been looted or blocked here.
6. **Fair mining around Bozoum.** Local benefit, safe working conditions and environmental safeguards from gold mining.
7. **Rebuilding services.** Health centres, schools and markets in Bocaranga, Koui and Ngoutéré, damaged by repeated cycles of violence.

Sangha-Mbaéré Prefecture

1. **Rights and livelihoods for the BaAka.** Secure land and forest-use rights, a fair share of tourism and logging revenue, and access to health and education adapted to forest communities.
2. **Sustainable forestry and wildlife protection.** Enforce logging management plans and anti-poaching laws, with legal livelihoods for newcomers who might otherwise turn to poaching.
3. **Growing ecotourism.** Expand gorilla and elephant tourism around Bayanga as a source of jobs and revenue that stays in the prefecture. This is one of the few genuine growth opportunities in western CAR.
4. **Fair diamond mining around Nola.** Cooperatives, traceability and fair prices for artisanal miners.
5. **Basic state services.** Functioning health centres, schools, water and humane detention conditions in Nola and the rural areas.
6. **Roads and cross-border trade.** Better links from Nola to Berbérati and to Cameroon and Congo, for markets and supplies.
7. **Health in remote forest areas.** Mobile clinics and vaccination for scattered forest communities.

Vakaga Prefecture

1. **Border security and civilian protection.** Disciplined national forces on the Sudan border, an end to RSF incursions and recruitment, and accountability for abuses by state forces and militias.
2. **Emergency aid for refugees and host communities.** Food, water, sanitation and shelter at Korsi and for host communities, so local residents do not lose out to refugees.
3. **Response for the 17,000 displaced from Am-Dafock.** Shelter, protection and a path home.
4. **Food security.** Safe access to fields at planting and harvest, seed support, and pre-positioned stocks before the rainy season isolates the prefecture.
5. **Social cohesion.** Rounga–Goula dialogue, and bringing self-defence groups under control, while enforcing the ban on recruiting children.
6. **Year-round access.** All-season roads or airstrip capacity so Vakaga is not cut off for six months a year.
7. **Health and education.** Services in Birao and Ouanda-Djallé, which are strained by refugees and insecurity.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC · BANGUI DECLARATION ON JOINT ACTIONS

SECTION 5 OF 5

Programme Implementation

Prefecture Implementation

Category A: Urban systems

Bangui

Current situation

- The city is politically stable after the December 2025 elections, but crime is rising. About 94,000 internally displaced people live in the prefecture, and nearly 40% of residents are poor.
- Power and water are fragile. In January 2026 a Boali breakdown cut both for more than a week, and replacement parts take at least six months. National generation is about 100 MW against demand of about 250 MW.
- Fuel shortages recurred in April and November 2025 and July 2026, raising fares and living costs.
- Flooding is worsening. Around 5,000 people in Kolongo and M'poko Bac have lived in standing water since July 2023. Cholera (declared June 2026 in Bimbo) and Ebola in neighbouring DRC are active threats.

Priority interventions

1. Reliable electricity: Boali spare parts, solar and thermal capacity, and backup for pumping and hospitals
2. Water and sanitation in underserved districts and in Bimbo and Bégoua
3. Flood drainage, river defences and planned resettlement
4. Jobs for young people in the informal economy
5. Community policing, street lighting and youth programmes
6. Epidemic preparedness for cholera, Ebola and measles
7. Strategic fuel stocks and transparent fuel imports

> **Opportunity for impact:** Backup solar power for water pumping and hospitals is the single intervention with the widest reach in the country. It addresses power, water and cholera risk at once.

Category B: Recovery and growth

Basse-Kotto

Current situation

- Security has largely been restored. The UPC signed a ceasefire in April 2025 and is demobilising, and MINUSCA handed over its Pombolo base in June 2026.
- Refugees have been returning to Alindao since 2025 and need housing, land and livelihoods.

- Schools, health centres and administrative buildings were looted or wrecked, and residents are alarmed by the state of Mobaye's public buildings.
- The economy rests on subsistence farming and river trade through Mobaye's port. As a stabilised area, it is likely to lose humanitarian funding.

Priority interventions

1. Reconciliation and accountability for the 2017–2018 atrocities
2. Shelter, land-dispute resolution and livelihoods for returnees and former fighters
3. Rehabilitating schools, health centres and offices in Mobaye, Alindao and smaller towns
4. Alindao–Bambari, Alindao–Mobaye and Mobaye–Zangba roads, and Mobaye river port
5. Seeds, tools, storage and processing
6. District hospitals and disease surveillance along the Ubangi
7. Boreholes and latrines in return areas

> **Opportunity for impact:** This is a strong candidate for an early flagship. Its needs are rebuilding and reconnection, which map directly onto the Declaration's pillars, and humanitarian agencies are pulling back.

Kémo

Current situation

- Security is improving but fragile. MINUSCA handed its Dékoa base to the government in June 2026, so security now rests with national forces.
- Farmer–herder tension is the main live threat. Violence east of Sibut in January 2025 displaced residents, and a Peuhl herder was killed near Galafondo.
- Health has a bright spot: with World Bank support, Sibut hospital has a new maternity unit. Medicines are still trucked from Bangui, and rural areas are far less well served.
- Cassava, groundnuts and sesame anchor incomes around the Sibut market. Rainy-season flooding cuts farms off from markets.

Priority interventions

1. Farmer–herder dialogue committees and agreed transhumance corridors
2. All-season maintenance of the Sibut–Dékoa–Kaga-Bandoro axis and feeder roads
3. Seeds, tools, storage and cassava and groundnut processing
4. Extending Sibut's hospital model to Dékoa, Mala and Ndjoukou, with a reliable drug supply
5. Rehabilitating schools damaged in 2013–15, and paying and keeping teachers
6. Rural boreholes
7. Jobs for young people and former fighters

> **Opportunity for impact:** Kémo is close to Bangui and has a proven health model to replicate. Roads plus agro-processing could show quick, measurable gains.

Lobaye

Current situation

- Security is stable. MINUSCA handed over its Mbaïki base in June 2026.
- Rural poverty is the core problem. Most people are poor coffee farmers, few children reach secondary school, and many die for lack of medical care.
- CAR's fifth-ever cholera outbreak was declared in June 2026 in the Mbaïki and Bimbo health districts, with 197 confirmed cases and 24 deaths.
- Logging is displacing Aka forest communities without compensation, and Wagner has extended its control over mining sites at Boda.

Priority interventions

1. Containing cholera, then boreholes, water treatment and sanitation
2. Mbaïki hospital and rural health posts, focused on mothers and children
3. Reviving coffee and food-crop value chains, with roads to Bangui markets
4. Recognising Aka customary land rights and sharing logging revenues
5. Enforcing logging rules and curbing illegal timber trafficking
6. Secondary schooling and jobs in agro-processing and forestry
7. Safe return of displaced Muslim residents to Mbaïki and Boda

> **Opportunity for impact:** Water and sanitation here deliver an immediate public-health return, and the coffee value chain is a ready-made growth opportunity next to Bangui's market.

Mambéré

Current situation

- The prefecture is relatively calm and features little in recent conflict reporting.
- Mining is controlled by outside armed actors. Across CAR, control passed from Wagner to the Russian defence ministry's Africa Corps after 2023, and production is neither monitored nor regulated.
- Artisanal miners remain poor. The lifting of the Kimberley Process embargo in 2024 has not yet improved incomes or governance.
- The Muslim community has never fully returned, which has hollowed out trading and livestock networks.

Priority interventions

1. Mining cooperatives, fair buying prices, traceability and local revenue-sharing
2. Safe return of displaced Muslim traders and herders to Carnot and Guen
3. Sustaining Carnot hospital and extending services to Gadzi, Amada-Gaza and Senkpa-Mbaéré
4. Agriculture, agro-processing and vocational training
5. Road links to Berbérati, Bouar and Bangui, and mobile coverage
6. Schools and teachers, especially in mining areas
7. Mine-site safety and land restoration

Opportunity for impact: Health and skills programmes in mining communities can start now. Formalising mining requires prior due diligence on who controls the sites.

Mambéré-Kadéï

Current situation

- A September 2026 UN report describes the area as broadly calm. Daily UN police patrols on the roads to Carnot, Sosso-Nakombo, Nola and Gamboula have restored traders' confidence.
- Even so, restrictions on movement are among the country's worst, through illegal checkpoints, extortion and abductions. Attacks continue on the Berbérati–Sosso-Nakombo road.
- Armed groups remain active at the margins, including a 3R clash at Yamalé in 2025 and anti-Balaka movements near Nandobo in 2026.
- Dialogue on cattle corridors has eased farmer–herder conflict, but transhumance remains a flashpoint.

Priority interventions

1. Removing illegal checkpoints and securing the Sosso-Nakombo and Gamboula routes
2. Mapped transhumance corridors, mediation and compensation
3. Formalising artisanal diamond and gold mining
4. Christian–Muslim reconciliation and return of Muslim traders from Cameroon
5. Gender-based violence services, legal aid and accountable police
6. Berbérati regional hospital and rural schools
7. The Cameroon–CAR security dialogue

Opportunity for impact: Berbérati's regional hospital serves the whole west, and market roads help traders directly. Existing corridor dialogue is a proven model to scale up.

Sangha-Mbaéré

Current situation

- Security is relatively stable. The prefecture escaped the worst of the conflict, and daily UN police patrols cover the Berbérati–Nola road.
- Conservation is a major employer. About 340 staff, including 140 rangers, work in the protected areas under joint management with WWF. One group of habituated gorillas reopened to tourists in 2025, with two more being prepared.
- State services are failing. In February 2026, health care at Nola prison had stopped entirely, with no water or power and a food allowance of 67 CFA francs (about US$0.12) per prisoner per day.

Priority interventions

1. Land and forest-use rights for the BaAka, a share of tourism and logging revenue, and adapted services
2. Enforcing logging plans and anti-poaching laws, with legal livelihoods for newcomers
3. Expanding gorilla and elephant tourism around Bayanga
4. Cooperatives, traceability and fair prices for diamond miners around Nola

5. Health centres, schools, water and humane detention in Nola and rural areas
6. Roads from Nola to Berbérati, Cameroon and Congo
7. Mobile clinics and vaccination for forest communities

> **Opportunity for impact:** Ecotourism is one of the few genuine growth opportunities in western CAR. It suits InvestCAR's investment promotion, provided BaAka communities share the benefits.

Category C: Stabilisation and reintegration

Bamingui-Bangoran

Current situation

- Security is improving but volatile. Nine FPRC and Siriri fighters demobilised in Ndélé in February 2026, and MINUSCA handed its Bamingui base to the government in June 2026. A grenade was thrown into an international NGO compound in Ndélé in February 2026.
- Sudan's war spills over through the Fertit region, and WFP feeds Sudanese refugees in Ndélé.
- Rule of law is very weak. There is no functioning prison, and detainees at Ndélé police station receive no state food.
- Services depend on NGOs. Sexual-violence care relies on Ndélé hospital, INTERSOS and MSF.

Priority interventions

1. Security and justice: trained police and gendarmes, a working court and prison, and safe roads
2. Reintegration of FPRC and Siriri fighters; Runga–Goula–Kara dialogue
3. Road links from Ndélé to Kaga-Bandoro, Bria and Birao, plus mobile coverage
4. Food security and peaceful transhumance
5. Ndélé hospital, rural health posts, and protection services
6. Shared water, schools and clinics for refugee-hosting communities
7. Conservation-linked jobs around the national park

> **Opportunity for impact:** Ndélé road links and shared services for refugees and hosts fall squarely within the Declaration's pillars. Park-related jobs offer a longer-term income source for former fighters.

Lim-Pendé

Current situation

- The 3R still holds armed positions across rural Lim-Pendé despite the peace deal. Tensions rose after three 3R fighters were killed at an army checkpoint.
- Sexual violence is the defining abuse. In February 2026, every conflict-related sexual-violence case attributed to signatory armed groups nationwide involved the 3R in Lim-Pendé.
- Farmer–herder revenge attacks continue, and the north-west is a main transhumance hotspot.

- Soldiers, sometimes alongside Russian-linked personnel, are reported to make arbitrary arrests and extort civilians. The prefecture has also received people fleeing violence in southern Chad, resettled at Bétoko.

Priority interventions

1. Completing 3R disarmament and reintegrating former fighters, especially Fulani youth
2. Medical, psychosocial and legal support for survivors, and safety for women in fields
3. Transhumance corridors, mediation committees and crop-damage compensation
4. Discipline and oversight of the army and Russian-linked personnel
5. Seeds, tools and market access
6. Rural health posts and schools in a densely populated, long-neglected area
7. Cross-border cooperation with Chad and Cameroon

> **Opportunity for impact:** Lim-Pendé has a large farming population, so agricultural support can reach many households. Siting water points and health posts to reduce women's exposure in fields is a practical protection measure.

Nana-Grébizi

Current situation

- The peace process is advancing. The MPC signed an agreement in N'Djamena in November 2025, and its disarmament resumed in mid-2026.
- Kidnappings and armed movements persist, including abductions at Grevaï, 30 km from Kaga-Bandoro, in March 2026.
- Herds destroyed fields at Kaga-Bandoro and Nana-Outa in February 2026, raising the risk of intercommunal violence.
- MINUSCA is closing its Mbrès base, which the Protection Cluster flags as a real risk to civilians. Kaga-Bandoro still had eight displacement sites as of March 2026.

Priority interventions

1. Reintegrating MPC fighters with jobs and training, and preventing splinter groups
2. Maintaining national-force presence and patrols around Mbrès as MINUSCA leaves
3. Transhumance corridors and mediation, building on local roundtables held since 2019
4. Return or local settlement for residents of the eight Kaga-Bandoro sites
5. A proper court and prison in Kaga-Bandoro, and an end to kidnapping for ransom
6. Inputs, storage and secure roads along the main trade corridor
7. Health, education and water around Mbrès and Nana-Outa

> **Opportunity for impact:** Kaga-Bandoro sits on the main national trade corridor. Farm support and storage there can serve returnees and former MPC fighters at the same time.

Nana-Mambéré

Current situation

- 3R disarmament is under way but incomplete. Fighters have been disarmed in stages at Bouar and Koui, a further operation for 100 fighters was planned in mid-2026, and MINUSCA handed over its Dilapoko base in June 2026.
- Residual 3R violence continues: six civilians were abducted at Gobolo in February 2026, and illegal livestock taxation continued at Zotoua.
- Four artisanal miners were killed at Zotoua-Banguerem. Clashes between 3R factions, one apparently working with Russian-linked personnel, raise concerns about collusion.
- Justice capacity is growing, with MINUSCA support for court open days and prison reform in Bouar.

Priority interventions

1. Completing 3R disarmament, with livestock and farming livelihoods for young herders
2. Removing armed checkpoints on livestock routes and preventing collusion by state-affiliated forces
3. Agreed corridors, livestock markets and fair dispute resolution between herders and farmers
4. Protecting miners around Yidéré-Baboua and Zotoua, with transparent oversight of mine revenues
5. Keeping the Bouar–Baboua–Garoua-Boulaï road to Cameroon safe and maintained
6. Courts that reach rural areas
7. Health, education and water in Abba, Baboua and Baoro

> **Opportunity for impact:** The Garoua-Boulaï road is CAR's main link to the sea through Cameroon. Investing in it serves the whole country while creating local jobs.

Ombella-M'Poko

Current situation

- Farmer–herder violence reaches the edge of the capital. Herders were killed around Bouboui, 35 km from Bangui, in January 2025, and near Sakoussa, 18 km away, in February 2026.
- The 3R operates this far south. About 50 3R members abducted two men on the Boali–Poste road in March 2026, and one was killed when his family could not pay a ransom of 3 million CFA francs (about US$3,000).
- The Protection Cluster ranks the prefecture among the worst for illegal checkpoints and extortion, and for witchcraft accusations and mob justice.
- The Boali hydro plants that supply Bangui are fragile. A rehabilitated court opened in Bossembélé in February 2026.

Priority interventions

1. Securing the Boali–Bossembélé–Yaloké corridor and completing 3R disarmament
2. Mapped corridors, mediation and compensation to break revenge cycles
3. Functioning courts, and protection for people accused of witchcraft
4. Maintenance, spare parts and new capacity at the Boali hydro plants
5. Helping farmers supply Bangui's market

6. Health, water and schools in Bogangolo and Damara
7. Removing illegal checkpoints on routes that feed Bangui

> **Opportunity for impact:** Boali is national infrastructure. Investment there secures Bangui's power and water and creates local jobs, while farm-to-Bangui supply chains offer quick income gains.

Ouaka

Current situation

- The UPC is demobilising. Its disarmament was launched in July 2025, and former UPC and 3R fighters began training as forest and water rangers in March 2026.
- Mining violence is the main flashpoint. On 26 March 2026, a self-defence group reportedly operating alongside Russian-linked personnel killed at least four artisanal miners at Ndassima.
- State forces levy illegal taxes at checkpoints around Bambari. The central prison is overcrowded, with a food allowance of 93 CFA francs (about US$0.16) per prisoner per day.
- Ouaka still had 12 displacement sites as of March 2026, and MINUSCA handed over its Ippy and Kouango bases in June 2026.

Priority interventions

1. Protecting artisanal miners and channelling mining revenue into local development
2. Removing illegal checkpoints and controlling militias that work with Russian-linked personnel
3. Livelihoods for UPC fighters and support for host communities
4. Return or local integration for residents of the 12 displacement sites
5. Functioning courts, humane prisons and protection for people accused of witchcraft
6. Securing the Bambari–Ippy–Bria, Bambari–Alindao and Bambari–Grimari–Sibut routes
7. Health, education and water

> **Opportunity for impact:** Bambari is the regional market hub for the centre-east. Trade roads and the existing ranger-training model for former fighters are the clearest entry points.

Ouham

Current situation

- Residual rebels and abusive security operations both persist. In March 2026, FDLP fighters killed three Chadian nationals at a mining site near Markounda. A joint operation involving soldiers, Russian-linked personnel and UPC intermediaries looted a health centre and burned houses at Bowaye.
- An FDLP commander arrested at Kouki was handed to Russian-linked personnel without judicial notice, and his whereabouts were unknown at the time of reporting.
- Disarmament is slow. UPC fighters waited at Kouki from June 2025 until an operation for 120 UPC and 80 MPC fighters was scheduled for June 2026.
- Ouham is a main transhumance hotspot with high child recruitment. On the positive side, detention conditions at Nana-Bakassa improved after upgrades.

Priority interventions

1. Processing the fighters waiting at Kouki and bringing the FDLP and CPC remnants into the peace process
2. Ending the use of armed-group intermediaries and protecting health centres during operations
3. Corridors, mediation and compensation, especially along the Bossangoa–Chad road
4. Jobs, training and peace programmes, building on Bossangoa's youth resistance to recruitment
5. Protecting miners and traders around Markounda, and coordinating with Chad
6. Rebuilding looted health centres and supporting rural schools
7. Return for people displaced by fighting and recent operations

> **Opportunity for impact:** Bossangoa's young people have a track record of resisting recruitment. A youth employment programme there could become a model for other prefectures.

Ouham-Fafa

Current situation

- The MPC signed an agreement in November 2025 covering Ouham-Fafa, and its disarmament resumed in mid-2026.
- Ouham-Fafa has the country's largest concentration of displacement: 25 of CAR's 77 sites as of March 2026, at Batangafo (10), Bouca (8) and Kabo (7).
- Attacks still cause new displacement. Armed men attacked Yima, 18 km from Batangafo, in February 2026, displacing more than 100 people.
- Health care depends heavily on MSF, which runs Batangafo's 150-bed hospital and supports five health centres.

Priority interventions

1. Return or local settlement for residents of 25 sites, some displaced for a decade
2. Reintegrating MPC fighters around Sido and Kabo, with accountable national forces
3. Patrols and early warning on the Batangafo, Bouca and Kabo roads
4. Transhumance corridors and cooperation with Chad on herds entering through Sido and Kabo
5. A long-term future for Batangafo hospital and rural health centres beyond MSF
6. Seeds, tools and market access for returning families
7. Schools in sites and return areas, and alternatives to recruitment

> **Opportunity for impact:** Helping people leave displacement sites is the defining need. Farm restarts, shelter and schools in return areas could close sites and show visible results.

Ouham-Pendé

Current situation

- 3R disarmament has begun (73 fighters disarmed at Koui in March 2026), but the 3R still causes the most harm.

- In March 2026, Ouham-Pendé and Lim-Pendé together recorded more human rights violations than any other area, driven by 19 cases of 3R child recruitment. All girls aged 14 to 16 who suffered 3R sexual violence that month had also been recruited by the group.
- The 3R denied NGOs humanitarian access in February 2026, and clashes with self-defence groups displaced people from Ngoutéré and Bozoum.
- Transhumance attacks near Bocaranga in January 2026 killed civilians and caused heavy livestock losses.

Priority interventions

1. Releasing all children held by the 3R, then family reunification, care, schooling and protection from re-recruitment
2. Demobilising remaining fighters around Koui and Bocaranga, with livelihoods
3. Care for survivors of sexual violence, especially adolescent girls
4. Corridors, mediation and compensation for crop and livestock losses
5. Guaranteed safe access for aid agencies
6. Local benefit, safety and environmental safeguards for gold mining around Bozoum
7. Rebuilding health centres, schools and markets in Bocaranga, Koui and Ngoutéré

> **Opportunity for impact:** Schools and vocational training for children leaving the 3R fit the Declaration's education pillar directly. They are also the most urgent protection need in the prefecture.

Category D: Active conflict and emergency

Haute-Kotto

Current situation

- The Wagner Group controls rich mining sites around Bria and Sam-Ouandja. Civilians and miners report that it uses terror to enforce a monopoly.
- The LRA remains present. In February 2026, Haute-Kotto recorded more grave violations against children than any other prefecture.
- Sudan spillover has reached the north, with clashes on the Sam-Ouandja–Ouanda-Djallé road in March–April 2026.
- The Protection Cluster lists killings, sexual violence, abductions, illegal taxation and high child recruitment.

Priority interventions

1. Protection and accountable security, including monitoring of Russian-linked personnel
2. Formal, transparent artisanal-mining arrangements
3. Care, family tracing and schooling for children escaping armed groups
4. Durable solutions for long-term displaced people, such as at PK3
5. Roads from Bria to Ippy, Ouadda and Yalinga
6. Bria hospital, mobile clinics and sexual-violence services
7. Farming and non-mining livelihoods for young people

Opportunity for impact: Bria hospital and mobile clinics are achievable now. Mining reform is the prize, but it is not workable while outside armed actors control the sites.

Haut-Mbomou

Current situation

- This is currently CAR's most violent prefecture. Fighting between the army and the AAKG militia has continued since the December 2025 elections, and in February 2026 it recorded more human rights violations than any other prefecture.
- Abuses come from all sides: the AAKG, state forces, Russian-linked personnel and a resurgent LRA. Peuhl and Muslim residents face particular hostility.
- About 30,000 people are displaced in the south-east. Aid operations were temporarily suspended, and the 300 km Bangassou–Zémio road takes 16–17 hours.
- Enrolment at Zémio's secondary school fell from 992 to 72 students in a year. One positive sign: about 700 people returned from DRC after a river crossing reopened in February 2026.

Priority interventions

1. Dialogue, hostage release and a disarmament path for the AAKG, with accountability on all sides
2. Safe access to fields, markets and roads for every community
3. Emergency shelter, food, water and health for about 30,000 displaced people
4. Securing and rehabilitating the Bangassou–Zémio–Obo road
5. Obo hospital, mobile clinics and sexual-violence care
6. Reopening schools and offering young people alternatives to recruitment
7. Azande–Peuhl reconciliation

Opportunity for impact: Supporting Obo hospital, the only referral facility, is the most realistic contribution. Larger investment should wait for a political settlement with the AAKG.

Mbomou

Current situation

- The Haut-Mbomou crisis is spilling over. The AAKG attacked an army detachment at Dembia on 3 February 2026.
- Mbomou had nine displacement sites as of March 2026, at Rafaï, Bangassou and Bakouma. About 1,500 Peuhl driven out of Zémio resettled around Bakouma, and Rafaï's hospital is strained.
- Aid access is fragile. Operations were temporarily suspended after attacks on aid teams, and militiamen entered a hospital looking for wounded soldiers. The Protection Cluster ranks Mbomou among the three prefectures at highest risk of attacks on civilians.
- Bangassou's prison is overcrowded, with children held alongside adults.

Priority interventions

1. Containing the AAKG conflict through dialogue, civilian protection and accountable forces
2. Return or local integration for Tokoyo's Muslims (displaced since 2017) and newly displaced Peuhl

3. Restoring Tokoyo's market and mosque, building on Bangassou's strong peace networks
4. Sustaining Bangassou's hospital, reinforcing Rafaï's, and mobile clinics for displacement sites
5. A functioning prison that separates children from adults
6. Securing the Bangassou–Rafaï–Zémio and Bangassou–Bakouma roads
7. Farming support and cross-river trade with DRC

> **Opportunity for impact:** Bangassou's hospital and its Catholic and community peace networks give the Declaration a trusted local base. From there it can support services that help contain the crisis.

Vakaga

Current situation

- Vakaga is one of CAR's most acute crises, driven mainly by Sudan's war. As of June 2026, the Korsi site in Birao held about 24,800 Sudanese refugees, about a quarter of the prefecture's population. At Korsi, 52 people share each latrine.
- Before the influx, 46% of people were already food insecure and 89% of households could not afford a healthy diet.
- RSF fighters have made incursions and recruited local youth. An attack on Am-Dafock on 30 June 2026 displaced about 17,000 people.
- Abuses by state forces and militias add to the danger. Soldiers fired on civilians at Ouanda-Djallé in February 2026, killing three. Vakaga recorded more incidents against aid workers than any other prefecture in January–July 2026. On the positive side, the prefect has banned child recruitment by self-defence groups.

Priority interventions

1. Disciplined forces on the Sudan border, an end to RSF incursions, and accountability for abuses
2. Food, water, sanitation and shelter at Korsi and for host communities
3. Shelter, protection and a path home for the 17,000 displaced from Am-Dafock
4. Safe access to fields, seed support and pre-positioned stocks before the rains
5. Rounga–Goula dialogue and control of self-defence groups
6. All-season roads or airstrip capacity, so Vakaga is not cut off for six months a year
7. Health and education in Birao and Ouanda-Djallé

> **Opportunity for impact:** Year-round access is the structural fix that every other intervention depends on. Pre-positioned food and seed stocks before the rainy season are the most practical near-term contribution.

Recommendations

1. **Phase delivery by category.**

- Phase 1: Bangui and the six recovery prefectures (Basse-Kotto, Kémo, Lobaye, Mambéré, Mambéré-Kadéï, Sangha-Mbaéré). Run full packages covering health, water, roads, farming and skills.

- Phase 2: The nine stabilisation prefectures. Link each package to a disarmament or farmer–herder process already under way.
- Phase 3: The four active-conflict prefectures. Until security allows more, limit work to supporting referral hospitals, food stocks and access, delivered through humanitarian partners.

1. **Select early flagships with visible results.** Strong candidates are backup solar power for Bangui's water pumping and hospitals, the Sibut health model extended across Kémo, Basse-Kotto's school and clinic rebuild, and water and sanitation in Lobaye to counter cholera.
2. **Make farmer–herder peace a cross-cutting design rule.** In the 11 prefectures where transhumance is a priority, site water points, markets and roads to support agreed corridors rather than undermine them.
3. **Design livelihoods for reintegration.** Make former fighters and at-risk youth an explicit target group for road labour, farm inputs and vocational training. The Ouaka ranger training and Bossangoa's youth resistance to recruitment are models to build on.
4. **Partner for what the pillars do not cover.** Security, justice, detention, disarmament and protection appear in most priority lists but sit outside the Declaration's six pillars. Formal links are needed with MINUSCA, the UN Protection Cluster, the national disarmament programme and justice-sector donors.
5. **Fill the humanitarian gap deliberately.** Target stabilised areas where humanitarian agencies are withdrawing, so that services such as Batangafo hospital (run by MSF) have a sustainable successor.
6. **Put mining and investment under strict due diligence.** Before InvestCAR promotes mining, logging or related investment, require verification of who controls each site. Russian-linked actors dominate major mining areas and face serious abuse allegations.
7. **Commission next steps.** These include costing per prefecture, identifying implementing partners in each prefecture, setting baseline indicators, and a quarterly review of each prefecture's delivery category.